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Presidential Power and Truman's Seizure of the
Steel Mills
Ken Hechler*
The blazing firestorm which greeted President Truman's seizure
of the steel mills in 1952 was cleverly orchestrated. The ferocity of
criticism totally overlooks the fact that Truman's actions were
consistent with his theory of presidential power demonstrated
during the close to eight years he occupied the White House.
Long before succeeding to the presidency, Truman had a clearly
formulated concept of the difference between strong and weak
presidents in American history. Seldom seen on the playground,
his glasses for weak eyesight caused him to spend an inordinate
amount of time in the library, and he concentrated on reading the
biographies of men and women. Early on, he was addicted to
Thomas Carlyle's dictum that great men create events rather than
vice versa.
Truman's love of history enabled him to formulate a theory of
executive leadership which extended beyond American shores to
great leaders throughout the world. About to deliver a nationwide
radio and television address on the Korean War, we discovered
him reading a biography of Charlemagne. Andrew Jackson was a
Truman hero, not only because he was the first president from
west of the Alleghenies, but also for his vigorous executive leader-
ship in measures to aid the hewers of wood and drawers of water
and his populist fight against the moneyed interests represented
by Nicholas Biddle and the national bank.
Among later presidents, Truman drew inspiration from Wood-
row Wilson for both his domestic and foreign policies. He admired
the fact that Wilson broke a century-old tradition by addressing
Congress in person instead of sending a written message, and also
Wilson's leadership on behalf of the establishment of the Federal
Trade Commission, the Federal Reserve Act, and the Clayton
Anti-trust Act. Wilson's internationalism, in contrast to midwest-
ern isolationism, attracted Truman's admiration.




Truman always had a thirst for history and the lessons for ex-
ecutive leadership. I recall the night before he fired General
MacArthur he asked me to prepare a memorandum on the rela-
tions between Abraham Lincoln and General George B. McClellan.
He immediately grasped the historic parallel between McClellan
who looked down his nose at Lincoln as a midwestern clod who
could not understand military strategy, and MacArthur, who had
analogous contempt for the Midwestern World War I artillery cap-
tain. Truman drew on my memorandum to announce his dedica-
tion to the principle of civilian control over the military, with the
comment that "the only thing new is the history you haven't read."
A fortuitous series of circumstances, including Truman's pen-
chant for deriving lessons from history, enabled me to get my job
at the Truman White House. While teaching at Princeton Univer-
sity in 1948, I asked George M. Elsey, one of Truman's Adminis-
trative Assistants and Princeton graduate, to visit my class to re-
late the inside story of how Truman won his upset victory over
Thomas E. Dewey in the 1948 election. Elsey later asked me
whether I could help prepare data on a Truman request for a
study to enable the president to counter the claims that his Fair
Deal programs were creating a "welfare state." Truman was upset
that every time he proposed programs for better housing, mini-
mum wage increases, aid to education or assistance to those at the
bottom of the economic scale, he was preaching socialism and the
welfare state. He pointed out that billions of Federal dollars had
been spent since Alexander Hamilton on land grants to the big
railroads, tax breaks and other subsidies which constituted "cor-
porate welfare."
Clark Clifford, Truman's special counsel, passed on my compre-
hensive study to the president with a complimentary memoran-
dum on December 22, 1949, that it would be used for presidential
speeches. Not long afterward, I joined the White House staff. In
addition to other duties, I was called on to produce a large number
of in-depth studies of issues which illustrated Truman's personal
desire to accumulate factual data to flesh out historical principles
which he had already formulated through his extensive reading.
For example, when Senator McCarthy began his hysterical tirades
about communists in the State Department and other agencies,
Truman asked me to prepare a historical analysis of "Witch Hunt-
ing and Hysteria" starting with the Salem Witchcraft Trials, and
covering the Alien and Sedition Acts passed during President
John Adams' administration, the Anti-Masonic Movement and the
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Know-Nothing Party, the Ku Klux Klan, the red scare raids by
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, and the manner in which all
these hysterical phases in American history eventually petered
out.
President Truman asked me to compile a collection of "scare
words" which he described as foolish predictions made by cynical
politicians when great projects were launched for the benefit of all
the people. For example, when Truman dedicated the Grand Cou-
lee Dam in 1950, he got a kick out of using a quotation I had found
from a Republican Congressman names Francis D. Culkin, who
had proclaimed in 1936 "that up in the Grand Coulee country
there is no one to sell power to except the coyotes and jackrabbits,
and there will never be." When he was in Iowa, Truman poked
fun at a dire prediction made by a Congressman in 1887, who la-
beled a $15,000 appropriation for agricultural experiment stations
as "absolutely destroying the independence and freedom of indi-
vidual conduct, and subverting the theory on which the govern-
ment is based."
I discovered that when the 1936 Soil Conservation Act was be-
ing debated, Massachusetts Congressman Joseph W. Martin, Jr.,
Republican Speaker of the House during the 80th Congress, had
denounced soil conservation regulation as "regimentation." Mar-
tin contended that farmers "are to be dominated and regimented
by the New Dealers for all time. No longer are they to be free
men."
Perhaps the most erroneous "calamity howler" came from the
President of the New York Bankers' Association who predicted in
1934 that "if the national debt ever goes up to $25 billion there
would be a wholesale liquidation of government securities."
When the Korean War broke out in 1950, Truman was charged
with having ruined American military strength by the pell-mell
demobilization which followed the end of World War II. The
president asked me to compile the public statements of prominent
Republicans who had clamored in 1945 for a quick release of mili-
tary personnel and their immediate return to civilian life. This
compilation proved that not only Generals Eisenhower and Mac-
Arthur, but also all leading Republican officials were criticizing
the Democrats for dragging their feet and not moving fast enough
to "bring the boys home."
Frequently, observers of Harry Truman concluded that he "shot
from the hip" because he made quick decisions on central issues.
This criticism was leveled at Truman when he seized the steel
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mills. Truman was a very hard worker and spent an inordinate
amount of time in the evenings reviewing documents which re-
lated to domestic and foreign problems. Therefore, when he made
speedy decisions, such decisions were made with the background
of careful advance consideration and weighing of alternatives from
extensive study of the issues involved.
On occasion, Truman responded very personally on the basis of
his vast personal experience and basic philosophy. He hated hy-
pocrisy. I recall during the campaign of 1952, Truman resented
the holier-than-thou statements of John Foster Dulles that he was
not as religious as the Republicans who were criticizing him for
failure to take aggressive action to free the captive peoples behind
the Iron Curtain in Eastern European nations bordering the So-
viet Union. Coming east along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
from Cincinnati into Parkersburg, West Virginia, he asked me to
give him a copy of the Bible so he could quote from the gospel ac-
cording to Saint Matthew, Chapter 6, which reads:
And when though prayest, though shalt not be as the hypo-
crites are for they love to pray standing in the synagogues and
in the corners of the streets that they may be seen of men.
But thou, when thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and when
thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret,
and thy Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee
openly.
In his Parkersburg address, after quoting the Bible, he added
that his grandfather used to tell him that when you hear someone
praying loudly in public "you had better go home and lock your
smokehouse."
Truman also had a penchant for unraveling complicated issues
in order to get to the heart of what was needed for an early solu-
tion. He frequently helped the staff to realize that intractable cri-
ses were not as serious as they seemed on the surface. Martin
Friedman was very upset one day when he received a phone call
from a Congressional committee staff member demanding copies
of all the raw F.B.I. files on every member of the White House
staff. When Friedman, an assistant in the White House personnel
office said this was impossible, the Congressional staff member
said if the files were not delivered, Congress would cut off the ap-
propriation for the White House. Friedman went into see the
president, who was signing papers in a methodical manner. After
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he breathlessly reported the crisis, Truman looked back up from
his paperwork and quickly answered: "You call that fellow back
and tell him we'll spend what we've got, and then we'll just close
up shop here at the white house." The crisis immediately evapo-
rated.
Winthrop W. Aldrich, Chief Executive Officer of the powerful
Chase National Bank in New York, became very angry one day
because President Truman kept him waiting far beyond the time
of his appointment. A staff member who noted the frequent
glances at his watch, the uneasy tapping of Aldrich's foot and his
thundercloud expression, entered the Oval Office to remind Tru-
man that a distinguished visitor was upset with the delay. Tru-
man immediately related the time when, as the Chairman of the
Senate War Investigating Committee, on a visit to the Chase Na-
tional Bank, Aldrich had kept the Senator waiting for an hour.
Truman then snapped, "Mr. Aldrich has exactly 22 minutes more
to wait!"
The storm of public criticism of Truman's seizure of the steel
mills made quite a point of Truman's bias in favor of labor unions,
and charged he was ignoring the national interest. These charges
completely overlook the fact that during the nationwide railroad
strike in 1946, Truman went before Congress to propose that leg-
islation be passed to draft the striking railroad workers into the
Army.
Later in 1946, when John L. Lewis broke his contract and
struck the United Mine Workers then under a Federal seizure or-
der, Truman went to court and forced Lewis to lift the strike by
fines against both the union and Lewis personally.
Two other examples of Truman's personal initiative involved as-
signments given to me. The president asked the State Depart-
ment to prepare a popular pamphlet to explain our foreign policy.
The manuscript was so turgidly worded that I was asked to take
the high-level "State Departmenteze" and reduce it to down-to-
earth and comprehensible language. A very popular pamphlet
entitled "Our Foreign Policy" was well received.
On another occasion, Truman asked me to prepare an analysis
of all the occasions and Congressional votes, plus Republican ap-
pointments he had made which illustrated his determination that
partisan politics should stop at the water's edge. Truman's per-
sonal friendship with Michigan Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg,
the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during
the Republican-controlled 80th Congress, was a key factor in the
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passage of the Marshall Plan, the multi-million dollar loan to
Greece and Turkey and other foreign policy initiatives. The study
I prepared was eventually published by the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee after the Democrats recaptured control of Con-
gress in 1948.
When Averell Harriman was Secretary of Commerce, he sent a
report by his department over to the White House. After reading
the executive summary of the substance of the report, Harriman
was caught flat-footed by Truman's questions about items he had
read about in the body of the report. Harriman related that he
never made that mistake again to rely on an executive summary
of anything sent to President Truman.
Early in 1951, President Truman agreed with his military ad-
visers that NATO should be strengthened by sending American
troops to Europe. Senator Robert A. Taft and a number of mem-
bers of the House and Senate strongly opposed this move, and one
of their tools of opposition was a series of resolutions requiring
Congressional approval before American troops could be sent to
Europe. Truman insisted that he had the power to carry out this
initiative without Congressional authorization, just as he did on
the steel seizure case. The issue of troops to Europe was not
tested in court, and in the year before the steel seizure case, the
president prevailed.
Truman's concept of presidential power was bolstered by the fol-
lowing statement by Theodore Roosevelt in his autobiography:
The most important factor in getting the right spirit in my
administration.. .was my insistence upon the theory that the
executive power was limited only by specific restrictions and
prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by
Congress under its constitutional powers.
This statement, along with the actions recounted above, define
President Truman's presidential character and provide insight
into why his actions in seizing the steel mills were consistent with
his theory of presidential power.
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